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This is my second blog entry commenting on Dave Snowden’s “Wave-particle duality\u201d<\/a> piece. My first reply<\/a> addressed the strawman, knowledge as thing and flow, and paradox issues. This one will address the other six issues he raised. Once again, they are:<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n 1. \u201cIf you think in categories, then the world is presented in categories or a failure to categorize.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n 2. \u201cJoe wants to create categories (hierarchical and otherwise) and that such a way of thinking is antithetical in language and form of argument to understanding a world informed by complexity science.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n 3. In \u201cComplex Acts of Knowing”<\/a> Dave \u201cintroduced the Cynefin framework and argued that we needed to understand that different approaches to knowledge management, communities etc applied depending on the context and that it was a mistake to argue for one approach over another without first developing an understanding of the nature of the system.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n 4. \u201cI also argued for a recognition that We always know more than we can say and we can always say more than we can write down was key to KM and that we had to learn to handle narrative and experience as much as we handled content and information centric views.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n 5. \u201cBy way of introduction I made reference to three generations of understanding KM. The pre-Nonaka period characterised by data warehousing and decision support, the Nonaka period characterised by attempts to make tacit knowledge explicit and early attempts at collaboration, and then a third or post Nonaka period which would recognise the importance of narrative etc. Joe and Mark spent a considerable amount of time arguing <\/a>that I had failed to realise that the most important distinction was between Knowledge Processing and Knowledge Management, and that their (Or Mark’s) understanding of this was the fault line between first and second generation KM.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n 6. For Joe categories are important. Thus (as he does in the paper)<\/a> if he can find examples for Nonaka like thinking in the pre-Nonaka period then my talking about three generations has to be false. Now the whole point about generations is that they overlap – Your father does not have to die so that you can exist. I was creating a way of viewing history as an unfolding and overlapping series of events not a set of categories where things were right or wrong.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n Categories, Categories<\/strong><\/em><\/font><\/font><\/p>\n Dave seems to think that there is a special problem about using categories in our thinking, or, more precisely about using categories in our descriptions of the world, and three of the six remaining issues he raised have to do with the idea of categories. He appears to object to the very idea of expressing one’s thoughts in terms of categories when he says: \u201cIf you think in categories, then the world is presented in categories or a failure to categorize.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n I had a number of reactions to this statement. First, I asked myself. How can the world<\/strong><\/em> be presented<\/strong><\/em> as failing to categorize? Clearly what Dave must have in mind here is that if one uses categories to express oneself, then one will describe the world in categories, or will criticize others from the viewpoint that they fail to distinguish the same categories as oneself. <\/font><\/font><\/p>\n While I think there is a lot of truth to this statement, I also found myself asking in response: How can one talk or write about the world without categories? Don’t we need to use categories to describe our discernment<\/strong><\/em> of old and new patterns? That is, to describe the distinctions we discern? Don’t we, in fact, have to invent categories when we see or recognize phenomena that are as yet unnamed, in order to describe or explain to others what we have invented or recognized? <\/font><\/font><\/p>\n And assuming that one cannot describe or explain the world without using categories, then doesn’t Dave use categories to describe and explain things, to tell stories, and to advance theories, frameworks, and models? And if he does, doesn’t he criticize others for failing to distinguish categories that he thinks are important, or for distinguishing categories that he doesn’t wish to recognize, or for using the wrong categories? To answer these questions I took another look at \u201cComplex Acts of Knowing,\u201d and this is some of what I found.<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n In the paper Abstract, Dave distinguishes between three generations<\/strong><\/em> of knowledge management, uses the tacit-explicit knowledge distinction, uses the terms, \u201ctimely information\u201d and \u201cdecision support\u201d (both are categories), uses the term \u201cBPR\u201d, mentions \u201ccontext,\u201d \u201cnarrative,\u201d and \u201ccontent management\u201d (three categories), refers to \u201cscientific management,\u201d refers to \u201ccomplex adaptive systems\u201d theory,\u201d \u201csensemaking,\u201d \u201cself-organizing capabilities,\u201d \u201cinformal communities\u201d \u201cnatural flow model of knowledge creation, disruption, and utilisation, refers to \u201cthe argument from nature of many complexity thinkers,\u201d \u201chuman capability,\u201d \u201corder,\u201d \u201cpredictability,\u201d ‘collective acts,\u201d \u201cindividual acts,\u201d \u201cthing,\u201d \u201cflow,\u201d and \u201cdiverse management approaches.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n The pattern of category use we find in the Abstract of the paper, is reflected throughout. On the second page, for example, we find a distinction between three \u201cages\u201d of knowledge management. We find references to \u201cacademics,\u201d \u201cmanagement,\u201d \u201cmanagement science,\u201d \u201cNewtonian Science,\u201d \u201cquantum mechanics,\u201d \u201cphase shift,\u201d \u201cdogma,\u201d \u201cmedieval,\u201d \u201cEnlightenment,\u201d \u201cesoteric complication,\u201d \u201cnew simplicity,\u201d \u201cmeaning,\u201d \u201cmissionary enthusiasm,\u201d \u201cconsultants\u201d \u201cpre-existing \u201cprimitive\u201d cultures,\u201d \u201crape,\u201d \u201cpillage,\u201d \u201cdisillusionment,\u201d \u201cknowledge gained through experience,\u201d \u201ctraditional forms of knowledge transfer,\u201d \u201capprentice,\u201d \u201ccollective knowledge,\u201d \u201cproblematic,\u201d \u201cSECI model,\u201d \u201csocialisation,\u201d \u201cexternalisation,\u201d \u201ccombination,\u201d \u201cinternalisation,\u201d \u201cdualistic,\u201d \u201cdialectical,\u201d \u201cknowledge capture,\u201d \u201ccollaborative computing,\u201d \u201cIntranets,\u201d \u201cextranets,\u201d \u201cJapanese tradition of \u201cOneness,\u201d\u201d rational, analytical, and Cartesian,\u201d \u201cinnovation,\u201d \u201cmanufacturing processes,\u201d \u201cknowledge programmes,\u201d\u201dorganisational asset,\u201d \u201cmore holistic and dialectical view.\u201d All of these are categories.<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n As we move through the rest of the paper, we find categories on every page. We find distinctions between \u201cupper and lower levels of acceptable abstraction in any knowledge exchange,\u201d \u201cteaching and learning cultures,\u201d \u201cBa\u201d and \u201cCynefin,\u201d \u201copen spaces or domains of knowledge\u201d or \u201csensemaking,\u201d \u201cBureaucratic\/Structured: teaching, low abstraction, \u201cProfessional \/Logical: teaching, high abstraction,\u201d \u201cInformal\/Interdependent: Learning, high abstraction,\u201d \u201cUncharted\/Innovative: Learning, low abstraction,\u201d \u201ccomplicated systems,\u201d \u201ccomplex systems,\u201d and \u201cchaotic systems,\u201d \u201cknown complicated systems,\u201d \u201cknowable complicated systems,\u201d \u201cknowledge flows,\u201d and \u201cJust in Time Knowledge Management.\u201d <\/font><\/font><\/p>\n So, Dave certainly does create, and use categories in expressing his views and describing the world. And if he does, doesn’t he criticize others for failing to distinguish categories that he thinks are important, or for distinguishing categories that he doesn’t wish to recognize, or for using the wrong categories? The answer is, of course. In \u201cComplex Acts of Knowing,\u201d he criticizes scientific management for using the language of cause and effect. He criticizes those who assume that knowledge is a \u201cthing,\u201d and those who don’t distinguish knowledge as a thing from knowledge as a flow. In exchanges with me in the actkm.org group he has criticized my distinctions among biological, mental, and cultural knowledge, and has claimed that my classification of system types is less desirable than his because it is \u201cmore complex\u201d and also \u201chierarchical.\u201d He criticizes \u201cquality management\u201d approaches because they refuse to recognize \u201ccomplexity.\u201d In short, he does all the things I have named above.<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n Moving on to Dave’s statement that: \u201cJoe wants to create categories (hierarchical and otherwise) and that such a way of thinking is antithetical in language and form of argument to understanding a world informed by complexity science.\u201d I think that either this statement is untrue or that it applies equally well to Dave’s own theorizing, since in \u201cComplex Acts of Knowing,\u201d and elsewhere he uses categories liberally, and also where and when he pleases. He also uses hierarchies as when he divides \u201ccomplicated\u201d systems, into the \u201cknown\u201d and the \u201cunknowable,\u201d knowledge into \u201ctacit\u201d and \u201cexplicit,\u201d and knowledge, again, into \u201cthings and flows.\u201d Now, it may be true that my particular set of categories \u201cis antithetical in language and form of argument to understanding a world informed by complexity science.\u201d But, if so, I think Dave needs to make that argument. <\/font><\/font><\/p>\n Earlier, in actkm exchanges we approached that discussion. I offered an alternative classification of system types to Dave’s. The exchange did not show that my classification was inferior to Dave’s. Rather, my classification was more complex and richer in detail than his, while his was simpler and non-hierarchical than mine. In the course of the exchange, it became clear that Dave was using his \u201ctypes\u201d to describe differing system states or strange attractors in phase space. However, when asked, he could not make explicit the dimensions or coordinate axes of his phase space, leaving the conceptual basis for his classification of system types unclear, and suggesting that my question about coordinate axes was motivated by attachment to categorical thinking and had nothing to do with what it is necessary to know to track the dynamics of a system in phase space. I leave it to my readers to evaluate how much sense this response makes.<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n The third \u201ccategory\u201d issue raised by Dave, once again, is stated this way: \u201cFor Joe categories are important. Thus (as he does in the paper) if he can find examples for Nonaka like thinking in the pre-Nonaka period then my talking about three generations has to be false. Now the whole point about generations is that they overlap – Your father does not have to die so that you can exist. I was creating a way of viewing history as an unfolding and overlapping series of events not a set of categories where things were right or wrong.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n This third issue really gets to what this \u201ccategory\u201d debate is all about. It’s not really that I use categories and Dave doesn’t, but rather that I’ve used categorical distinctions and related analysis to question Dave’s interpretations and claims about facts. In \u201cGenerations of KM,\u201d Mark and I criticized Dave’s three ages view of Knowledge Management by juxtaposing our own two generations view, by questioning whether his facts about the first two ages are correct, and also and most importantly based on whether his conceptual distinctions between the three ages are important from a theoretical perspective. <\/font><\/font><\/p>\n Above, he says that our criticism of his three ages view is false, because it doesn’t recognize that his three categories are fuzzy, and that there is considerable overlap of ages or generations. But I think that here Dave is missing the point. We criticized his three ages theory of KM change because we disagreed with his characterization of the facts as well as because we thought we had a better set of categories for describing change in KM. Thus, Dave characterizes the first age as mostly about \u201cinformation for decision support.\u201d At one level that’s correct, but: (Generations of KM, p. 7)<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201cFirst, <\/font><\/font>was there really no more to the first age of KM than “information for decision support\u201d? If so, then why was the term KM used at all? After all, the field of business intelligence provides information for decision support. So do data warehousing and data mining. And so does the still broader category of Decision Support Systems (DSS). So what was the term KM supposed to signify that those other terms do not?<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Second, also, if there was no more than information for decision support to the first age, then what were the attempts to distinguish data, information, knowledge and wisdom about? What was the development of Xerox’s community of practice for the exchange of knowledge among technicians about? What was knowledge sharing at Buckman laboratories in 1987 and 1992 (Rumizen, 1998) about? Where does Hubert St. Onge’s work (See Stewart, 1999) on the relationship of customer capital to the learning organization fit? Or Senge’s (1990) work on systems thinking? Or Karl Wiig’s early introductions to KM (1993, 1994, 1995)?<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In brief, Snowden’s characterization of the first age of KM as focused on providing information for decision support and implementing BPR schemes suggests much too heavy an emphasis on KM as primarily composed of IT applications to reflect the full reality of the first age. In fact, his failure to take account of the human side of KM during the first age suggests a desire for the same kind of neat distinction we find in Koenig’s analysis. In effect, Snowden, like Koenig, seems to want to say that the first age was about technology and the second age was about the role of people in Nonaka’s four modes of conversion.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In other words, our factual disagreement with Dave, wasn’t just based on some earlier than 1995 \u201cNonaka-like thinking.\u201d Rather, there were so many exceptions to Dave’s categorization of the period that one could drive the proverbial truck through the picture of the first age he conjectured. Nor was his conjecture characterizing the second age as essentially about working the implications of Nonaka’s SECI model <\/a>any more accurate. As we said just following the above passage (ibid. p. 8):<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n \u201cThird, in describing the second age of KM, Snowden’s account is, once again, far too spare in its characterization. No doubt, the Nonaka and Takeuchi book has had an important and substantial impact on KM, but the period since 1995 has seen important work done in many areas not explicitly concerned with knowledge conversion.<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n These areas include semantic network analysis, the role of complex adaptive systems theory in knowledge management, systems thinking, intellectual capital, value network analysis, organizational learning, communities of practice, content management, knowledge sharing,conceptual frameworks for knowledge processing and knowledge management, knowledge management metrics, enterprise information portals, knowledge management methodology, and innovation, to name some, but far from all, areas in which important work has been done.\u201d<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Work in these areas was very common during the period 1995 \u2013 2002, when we wrote our paper, and its existence belies Dave’s interpretation that KM in this age was primarily about working through the SECI model. Further, our theoretical reasons for differing with Dave’s three ages \u201cfuzzy\u201d categorization, can be easily stated.<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201cBoiled down to its essentials, Dave almost seems to be saying:<\/font><\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/font><\/p>\n So, Snowden’s story of change is not guided by a transcendent conceptual framework that can provide us with categories to set a context for describing change, but rather is a claim that KM proceeds from vision to vision expressed in great books and\/or articles. His view provides no guide about what the next fundamental change in KM will bring, because how can we know what the rest of a story might be?”<\/font><\/font><\/font><\/font><\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n\n
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